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“HALF COCKED”: THE PERSISTENCE OF 
ANACHRONISM AND PRESENTISM 




James Lindgren’s recent forward to The Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology’s 2015 symposium on “The Past and Future of Guns,” 
purports to be a neutral and scholarly account of the current state of the 
debate on the meaning of the Second Amendment.  Lindgren’s introductory 
essay fails to achieve both of these goals.  Rather than survey the pre-Heller 
scholarship in a comprehensive and even-handed manner, Lindgren 
provides a distorted and superficial account of the historical literature.  He 
compounds this error by ignoring the vast post-Heller scholarly literature, 
failing to note that much of this recent body of scholarship has been deeply 
critical of Heller, and has generally vindicated the work of the historians he 
criticizes.  Indeed, the evidence he himself offers in defense of his 
interpretation actually undercuts his claims about the meaning of the 
Second Amendment.  Lindgren’s essay does not chart a path forward in this 
contentious debate, but proffers an incomplete and analytically flawed 
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2. CORNELL 3/1/2017  5:54 PM 
204 CORNELL [Vol. 106 
THE FUTURE OF THE PAST:  HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIP 
AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT AFTER HELLER 
Reading James Lindgren’s recent forward to The Journal of Criminal 
Law and Criminology’s symposium on “The Past and Future of Guns,”1 one 
might be tempted to think that nothing new on the Second Amendment had 
been written in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision in District of 
Columbia v. Heller.2  In fact, Heller has spawned a vast new scholarly 
literature.3  Not only does Lindgren not engage with the historical 
scholarship written prior to Heller, he fails to consider the post-Heller 
literature, rendering his account of the state of the debate over the Second 
Amendment’s historical meaning both incomplete and unsound.4  Moving 
forward in the contentious debate over firearms regulation does, as 
Lindgren asserts in his discussion of the policy issues,5 require more 
attention to evidence, but this sage counsel applies to history every bit as 
much as it applies to statistical analysis.6 
It is a bit surprising to see an article on the past and future of the gun 
debate that makes no mention at all of important recent work by scholars 
such as Duke University’s Joseph Blocher and Darrell Miller, Yale 
University’s Reva Siegel, or Harvard scholar Cass Sunstein, to name just a 
few of the new voices and senior figures in constitutional law that have 
entered this ideologically charged field after Heller.7  All of these scholars 
reject Lindgren’s interpretation of history and his reading of Heller.8  Some 
 
1  James Lindgren, Forward: The Past and Future of Guns, 104 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 705 (2015). 
2  554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
3  See infra notes 7–10. 
4  See infra notes 7, 9, 11. 
5  Lindgren, supra note 1, at 705, 711. 
6  See PHILIP J. COOK & KRISTEN A. GOSS, THE GUN DEBATE: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO 
KNOW 155–70 (2014) (providing an overview of the historical roots of American gun control 
measures).  Although scholarly standards demand such rigor, there is little evidence that this 
has much impact on public policy debates.  See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More 
Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 
1291, 1311–18 (2003). 
7  See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second 
Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2009); Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 
YALE L.J. 82, 85–90 (2013); Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the 
Seventh Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852 (2013); Darrell A. 
H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L.  
REV. 1278 (2009); Cass Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 246 (2008); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular 
Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008). 
8  See infra pp. 207–08 (describing the civic rights interpretation of the Second 
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of the harshest criticism of the D.C. gun case and its abuse of history has 
come from conservative scholars and judges, including Richard Epstein, 
Charles Fried, Richard Posner, and J. Harvie Wilkinson, another fascinating 
aspect of the post-Heller jurisprudential landscape that Lindgren neglects.9 
In a brief response it would be impossible to survey the full richness of 
the new scholarly developments Lindgren overlooks.10  Nor does space 
permit a detailed exposé of all of the historical errors and analytical flaws in 
Heller and the outdated body of scholarship Lindgren cites in his essay.11  
In the interest of moving the debate forward, some salient points are worth 
stressing. 
There is substantial scholarly support for the argument that the 
“individual rights” view articulated in Heller and defended by Lindgren 
was largely an invented historical tradition.12  Gun rights advocates both 
within and outside of the legal academy worked assiduously to create this 
revisionist history of the Second Amendment13 and deployed it effectively 
 
Amendment). 
9  J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. 
L. REV. 253, 254 (2009) (“Heller represents a triumph for conservative lawyers.  But it also 
represents a failure—the Court’s failure to adhere to a conservative judicial methodology in 
reaching its decision.”); Richard A. Epstein, A Structural Interpretation of the Second 
Amendment: Why Heller is (Probably) Wrong on Originalist Grounds, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
171, 173–74 (2008); Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and 
Gun Control, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 26, 2008), https://newrepublic.com/article/62124/
defense-looseness; Charles Fried, The Second Annual Kennedy Lecture: On Judgment, 15 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1025, 1045 (2011) (arguing that the “inappropriate” application of 
history “led the Court astray” in Heller). As Sanford Levinson notes, “Even more to the 
point, with regard to grasping the complexity of the contemporary debate, is the fact that 
some strikingly hostile responses to Heller have been written by judges and scholars usually 
(and accurately) identified with the conservative politics.” Sanford Levinson, United States: 
Assessing Heller, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 316, 319 (2009). 
10  See the articles cited in notes 7 and 9 for a small sampling of post-Heller scholarship 
critical of Heller and many of the historical assumptions upon which Lindgren’s essay relies. 
11  Lindgren’s approach embodies many of the vices of law office history and “history-
lite.” For the prevalence of these flaws in much Second Amendment scholarship, see 
generally Martin S. Flaherty, Can The Quill Be Mightier Than The Uzi?: History 
“Lite,”“Law Office,” And Worse Meets The Second Amendment, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 663 
(2015). For further elaboration on this point, see infra pp. 206–18. 
12  Ironically, Lindgren falls prey to a vice decried by Justice Scalia in a critique of 
legislative history.  Lindgren’s selective survey of research in this area was similar to the 
exercise criticized by Justice Scalia in which judges “look over the heads of the crowd and 
pick out [one’s] friends.”  ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 36 (1997). Lindgren cites approvingly the work of his former co-
bloggers at The Volokh Conspiracy, such as Randy Barnett and Eugene Volokh, and ignores 
the dozens of critiques of Heller from across the ideological spectrum.  See supra notes 6, 8 
and accompanying text. 
13  See generally David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 
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in Heller.  As Reva Siegel and Michael Waldman have each shown, the 
individual rights interpretation of the Second Amendment was a modern 
creation.14  For most of the last century the dominant interpretation of the 
Second Amendment was as a collective right, not an individual right.  The 
eminent early twentieth century Harvard legal scholar Zechariah Chafee, Jr. 
captured the earlier scholarly consensus around this conception in an 
influential article written more than seventy years before Heller: “[u]nlike 
the neighboring amendments,” the Second Amendment, Chafee averred, 
“safeguards individual rights very little and relates mainly to our federal 
scheme of government.”15  Chafee’s article was hardly the only one to 
embrace such a view. Most legal scholars and courts accepted this 
collective rights view until a new wave of revisionist scholarship emerged 
in the 1990s.16 
Lindgren’s dismissive characterization of historians’ efforts to 
formulate a new paradigm for understanding the Second Amendment prior 
to Heller is cast in quasi-conspiratorial terms, as if it were part of some 
nefarious anti-gun agenda.  Lindgren’s account of this historiography 
confuses two different groups of scholars and fails to understand the 
connections between Second Amendment scholarship and early American 
 
1998 BYU L. REV. 1359 (1998); Glenn H. Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second 
Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461 (1995) (discussing Second Amendment scholarship).  For 
a critique of the revisionist paradigm, see infra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
14  MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A BIOGRAPHY xiii, 87–140 (2014) 
(arguing that the prominence of the individual rights interpretation is the result of a 
“jurisprudential campaign” by gun-rights activists that began in the 1970s); Siegel, supra 
note 7, at 239 (arguing that throughout most of the twentieth century, legal scholars 
interpreted the Second Amendment with a primary emphasis on the militia clause, but that 
“decades of gun rights mobilization transformed the ‘natural’ meaning of the Constitution’s 
text so that . . . a law-and-order Second Amendment simply appeared there as the founders’ 
Constitution”); see also Robert J. Spitzer, Lost and Found: Researching the Second 
Amendment, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 349, 371 (2000) (charting the rise of a new individualistic 
interpretation of the Second Amendment and discussing the role of gun rights advocates in 
advancing this view). 
15  Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Right to Bear Arms, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOC. SCI. 209 
(1930).  On the intellectual, political, and legal significance of the Encyclopedia in American 
life, see Jerome Hall, The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 25 ILL. L. REV. 233 (1930) 
(book review) (“Not since the day of the French encyclopedists has as significant a task been 
undertaken.”). Chafee drew on an earlier article by Lucilius A. Emery, The Constitutional 
Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 28 HARV. L. REV. 473 (1915), which was among the most 
influential law review essays developing this point of view. See Spitzer, supra note 14, at 
384. 
16  See Spitzer, supra note 14, at 384 (providing additional evidence that the Chafee view 
was the dominant paradigm for understanding the Second Amendment for much of the last 
century). 
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historiography.17  He argues that historians: 
[W]ith essentially no original evidence to support their view—and some evidence 
directly contrary to it—the states’ rights academics came up with an entirely new 
view, which they termed the “civic rights” view.  According to this view, the right to 
keep and bear arms was an individual right, but it could be exercised only with the 
permission of the state in a militia.18 
It is hard to credit the claim that there was no new evidence to support 
the view that the Second Amendment was a civic right.  Indeed, Lindgren’s 
hyperbole is typical of much gun rights oriented scholarship, and it is 
precisely for this reason that Sanford Levinson has described such claims as 
antithetical “to serious intellectual debate.”19  The new historical paradigm 
that Lindgren mocks, variously described as a limited individual right, a 
militia-based right, or a civic right emerged almost simultaneously in the 
writings of scholars who were working independently from one another and 
employing different methodological tools, but who were all responding to 
debates and trends within early American legal historiography.20  The one 
commonality among all the scholars drawn to this paradigm was not their 
connection to contemporary gun politics or previous support for its theory 
of states’ rights, but their emphasis on the necessity of rooting Founding 
Era American law in the culture of the early modern Anglo-American 
Atlantic world.21 
 
17  Lindgren, supra note 1, at 707. 
18  Id. 
19  Levinson, supra note 9, at 327. Among the multitude of new sources consulted by 
scholars associated with the civic paradigm were H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. 
MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL 
SILENT 150 (2002) (exploring the Latinate origins of the ablative absolute used in the Second 
Amendment); Saul Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism: The Standard Model, the 
Second Amendment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 16 
CONST. COMMENT. 221, 227–35 (1999) (challenging the belief that Pennsylvanians sought a 
modern-style individual right at the time of the state’s drafting of its constitution by 
analyzing the Test Acts, a law that disarmed part of the population and the views of the Anti-
Federalist Dissent of the Minority); David Thomas Konig, The Second Amendment: A 
Missing Transatlantic Context for the Historical Meaning of “the Right of the People to 
Keep and Bear Arms,” 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 119, 120 (2004) (exploring the conventions on 
preambles and the disarmament of the Scottish militias). 
20   Lindgren, supra note 1, at 707. 
21  Lindgren conflates two different groups of historians working on the Second 
Amendment in recent years: those associated with a collective rights model, and those who 
advanced a civic rights model.  For a more nuanced and accurate discussion of the 
historiography, see William Merkel, A Cultural Turn: Reflections on Recent Historical and 
Legal Writing on the Second Amendment, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 667, 672 (2006) 
(arguing that historical scholarship opposing the individual rights view is best seen in terms 
of a republican school focusing on a civic right and a traditional states rights interpretation, 
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The claim that this new historical paradigm lacked any evidence from 
the Founding Era neglects the centrality of the militia and the related fear of 
standing armies to Anglo-American republican discourse in the period 
between the Glorious Revolution and the adoption of the amended 
Constitution.22  The pervasiveness of republican ideas in the legal and 
political discourses of the Atlantic world in the eighteenth century has been 
documented time and again by historians of early modern political 
thought.23  More than forty years of historiography on republicanism 
contradicts Lindgren’s suggestion that the new civic paradigm was 
somehow conjured out of thin air.24  Lindgren’s misunderstanding of the 
relevant historiography goes beyond his lack of appreciation for the 
centrality of republicanism to Anglo-American legal culture in this 
period—his analysis demonstrates a failure to grasp some of the most 
elementary principles of historical inquiry.  Thus, he confidently asserts 
that: 
The problem with [the civic rights model] was that, again, there was no contemporary 
evidence from the Framers’ era to support it, and, indeed, no one had ever heard of the 
civic rights view for the first two centuries of the Second Amendment’s existence.  
The first use of the term “civic right” to describe the Second Amendment in American 
law reviews appeared in a 2002 article by the historian Saul Cornell.  It would be 
strange if most of the Framers held the civic rights view of the Second Amendment, 
but kept it a secret from everyone, including the other Framers.25 
It is hardly surprising that the Founding Generation did not use a term 
invented by modern scholars to describe the Second Amendment—how 
could they?26  Lindgren has fallen into an elementary historical fallacy. By 
conflating what modern historians have said about the past with what 
historical actors actually said in the past, Lindgren has confused a 
 
sometimes described as a collective right). 
22  See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT 
AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION, 183–216 (1975) (arguing that the Second 
Amendment derives from a language about freedom and the militia stretching back to 
Machiavelli and the Renaissance). 
23  For a useful overview of this concept and the related notion of civic humanism, see 
Philip Pettit et al., Republicanism, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward 
N. Zalta ed., 2003), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2003/entries/republicanism/; 
Athanasios Moulaskis, Civic Humanism, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2011),  http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/humanism-
civic/. 
24  See G. Edward White, Reflections on the “Republican Revival”: Interdisciplinary 
Scholarship in the Legal Academy, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 5 (1994); Daniel T. Rodgers, 
Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11, 14–17 (1992). 
25  Lindgren, supra note 1, at 708. 
26  See supra note 21. 
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“semantical question about the name by which the object is called,” with 
the historical object itself.  In essence, he blurs the differences between 
primary and secondary sources by conflating modern historical labels with 
the historical beliefs they describe.27 
From a strictly textualist interpretive modality, the assertion that there 
is no evidence for a militia-based reading of the Amendment is easily 
rebutted by reference to the Second Amendment’s text, especially its 
preamble.28  Lindgren attempts to get around this particular textual 
embarrassment by invoking the authority of libertarian legal scholar Eugene 
Volokh’s controversial, and now largely discredited, claim about the role of 
preambles in Founding Era constitutional texts.29  Unfortunately, Lindgren 
ignores the scholarly critiques of Volokh’s work, some voiced before Heller 
and others elaborated since the decision.30  Moreover, anyone familiar with 
Founding Era sources would have little trouble finding evidence to 
challenge Volokh’s anachronistic interpretation.  A good place to start 
might be the 1750 legal dictionary authored by Giles Jacob, a popular 
Founding Era text among lawyers.31  Thomas Jefferson and John Adams 
each owned a copy of Jacob’s law dictionary.32  Jacob defined the role of a 
 
27  DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, HISTORIANS’ FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF HISTORICAL 
THOUGHT 21 (1970). 
28  On textualism as a basic modality of constitutional interpretation, see PHILLIP BOBBIT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 25–38 (1982). 
29  Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 801–
02 (1998) (arguing that the preamble to the Second Amendment should not be interpreted as 
establishing the sole purpose of the Amendment, but simply a purpose). 
30  David Thomas Konig, The Second Amendment: A Missing Transatlantic Context for 
the Historical Meaning of the Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms, 22 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 119, 154-55 (2004) (analyzing a number of Founding era constitutional and legal 
treatises treating preambles as the key to establishing the meaning of a text); see generally 
David Thomas Konig, Why the Second Amendment Has a Preamble: Original Public 
Meaning and the Political Culture of Written Constitutions in Revolutionary America, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 1295 (2009) (providing additional evidence that Volokh’s interpretation of 
preambles was historically flawed).  Taken together Konig’s two essays have effectively 
discredited the Volokh thesis. Indeed, legal scholar Sanford Levinson, a leading proponent 
of the individual rights view and critic of Heller describes Konig’s critique of the 
Volokh/Scalia view of preambles as “devastating.” Levinson, supra note 9, at 321. 
31  See generally GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1750). See also Konig, 
supra note 19, at 156 (describing the wide use of Jacob’s dictionary in the eighteenth 
century). 
32  For additional evidence of the influence of Jacob’s dictionary in early America, see 
Gary L. McDowell, The Politics of Meaning: Law Dictionaries and the Liberal Tradition of 
Interpretation, 44 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 257, 261 (2000). Although McDowell demonstrates 
the importance of legal dictionaries, his account of the Lockean assumptions about language 
in the Founding Era is deeply flawed. For a more sophisticated account of John Locke’s 
views of language, see Hannah Dawson, Locke on Language in (Civil) Society, 26 HIST. POL. 
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preamble in a way that flatly contradicts Volokh’s claims: “[t]he Preamble 
of a Statute . . . which is the Beginning thereof, going before, is as it were a 
Key to the Knowledge of it, and to open the Intent of the Makers of the Act; 
it shall be deemed true, and therefore good Arguments may be drawn from 
the same.”33  This particular gloss on preambles, derived from Lord Coke, 
was echoed in New Jersey Justice of the Peace James Parker’s popular 
Founding Era legal guide.34  A 1788 advertisement for Parker’s guide 
described the book as essential reading for Americans interested in the law.  
“This book is highly esteemed and very necessary” not only for gentleman 
in their public capacity as Justices of the Peace, but for “every other person 
who would wish to be acquainted with the laws of the land we live in.”35  
Volokh’s analysis of preambles ignores these types of sources and other 
relevant texts essential to recovering the Founding Era’s interpretive 
assumptions and rules of construction.  Instead of reconstructing Founding 
Era practices, Volokh erroneously employs approaches to statutory 
construction drawn from treatises written a half century later.  In short, 
Volokh reads history backwards, applying nineteenth century rules to 
understand eighteenth century texts.  If one corrects his anachronistic 
methodology and applies the correct eighteenth century rules and 
 
THOUGHT 397 (2005). For the relevance of Dawson’s work to the originalism debate, see 
Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, The Poverty of Public 
Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575, 586 (2011). 
33  JACOB, supra note 32, under “statute.” Volokh does not consult Giles, and 
misconstrues  other relevant Founding Era sources by applying the rules found in nineteenth 
century treatises, including JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE WRITTEN LAWS 
AND THEIR INTERPRETATION § 48 (1882); FORTUNATUS DWARRIS, A GENERAL TREATISE ON 
STATUTES GENERAL TREATISE ON STATUTES 688 (39th ed. 1835); THEODORE SEDGWICK, A 
TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF 
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 55 (1857); E. FITCH SMITH, COMMENTARIES ON 
STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 
§§ 562, 567, 573 (1848). Justice Scalia emulated Volokh’s anachronistic practice of using 
texts written at least a half century after the Second Amendment to reconstruct its original 
meaning. See Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 
793, 808 n.51 (1998); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 578 (2008). 
34  JAMES PARKER, CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: OR, THE OFFICE, DUTY, AND AUTHORITY OF 
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, vii (1788). 
35  PARKER, supra note 34, at vii. In the period between 1788 and 1791 Coke’s rules on 
preambles were included in half of the James Parker manuals published in America in this 
interval.  For a good example of how Parker’s views of preambles influenced other popular 
legal writers in this period, see FRANCOIS XAVIER MARTIN, THE OFFICE OF THE JUSTICE OF 
THE PEACE 186 (1791).  On the importance of justice of the peace manuals in shaping early 
American legal culture, see generally Larry M. Boyer, The Justice of the Peace in England 
and America from 1506 to 1776: A Bibliographic History, 34 Q.J. LIBR. OF CONGRESS 315 
(1977); John A. Conley, Doing It by the Book: Justice of the Peace Manuals and English 
Law in Eighteenth-Century America, 6 J. LEGAL HIST.  257 (1985). 
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assumptions to the text, one of the central pillars of Justice Scalia’s 
textualist argument in Heller collapses.36 
Additional evidence that the Volokh/Lindgren/Scalia approach to 
preambles is historically flawed is provided by the very example Lindgren 
offers to substantiate his interpretation.  When read in context, Lindgren’s 
own effort to buttress Volokh’s argument, drawn from the Virginia 
Declaration of Rights’ provision on freedom of religion, actually 
undermines Volokh’s claim about the function of preambles in the 
Founding Era.37  The Virginia text asserts: 
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging 
it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and 
therefore all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the 
dictates of conscience.38 
Lindgren’s gloss on this text is ahistorical; rather than reconstruct 
eighteenth-century patterns of reading as the baseline for interpreting this 
text,  he simply reads the text as any modern lawyer might.39 For Lindgren, 
“reason” is synonymous with logic and rationalism. Although this might be 
a plausible reading if the text were written today, such an interpretation is 
 
36  Although Volokh did not consult Founding era justice of the peace manuals in his 
work on preambles, in his later writing on the Second Amendment he does invoke their 
authority as highly probative of Founding era legal meaning. See Eugene Volokh, The First 
and Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 97, 101 (2009) (describing the 
importance of justice of the peace manuals as evidence of public meaning in the Founding 
Era). 
37  Lindgren, supra note 1, at 707. 
38  George Mason, THE VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (June 12, 1776). 
39  Lindgren’s interpretive approach is under-theorized in his essay, but he appears to be 
using a textualist modality, taking the reasonable modern reader as his baseline for 
interpreting the Virginia Declaration of Rights, a profoundly ahistorical approach to reading 
an eighteenth century text. Thus, his interpretation neither follows a genuinely originalist 
approach nor an authentic historical one. Cf. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as 
a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT 47, 48 (2006) (arguing for the reasonable Founding 
Era reader as the basis for constructing original meaning).  On the historical alternative to 
originalism, see generally Saul Cornell, Originalism As Thin Description: An 
Interdisciplinary Critique, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2015); Saul Cornell, Meaning and 
Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas: The Intellectual History Alternative to 
Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.  721 (2013); Jonathan Gienapp, Historicism and Holism: 
Failures of Originalist Translation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 935 (2015); Jack N. Rakove, Tone 
Deaf to the Past: More Qualms about Public Meaning Originalism, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 3 
(2015). There are multiple candidates for the legal meaning of a text, and not all are 
determined by history. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its 
Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235 (2015) (surveying 
a variety of different possible candidates for how to ascertain the relevant legal meaning of a 
text, including reasonable meaning, linguistic meaning, contextual meaning, intentional 
meaning, and interpreted meaning). 
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hard to reconcile with the linguistic and ideological context in which the 
text was written and read in 1776.  Here is how Lindgren reads the text: 
Because of the preamble to Virginia’s Bill of Rights, would it be reasonable to think 
that Virginia could decide to protect religions that are based on reason, but not 
religions based on tradition and memorized catechisms? Of course not.  The preamble 
gives a rationale and a purpose to the right (in this case, the protection of religious 
liberty); it does not restrict it.40 
 The term “reason” in this context was synonymous with the free 
exercise of an individual’s mental faculties: it meant to argue or to debate.41  
Lindgren is clearly not familiar with the Enlightenment background of the 
Founding Era and its relevance to the history of religious freedom.42  
George Mason, the primary architect of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, 
and Thomas Jefferson, another champion of religious freedom, were both 
profoundly influenced by John Locke’s writings on toleration.43  Locke and 
those who drew inspiration from him used the term “reason” in a much 
broader sense than Lindgren’s ahistorical reading of the text suggests: 
“Every Man,” Locke wrote, “has Commission to admonish, exhort, 
convince another of Error; and by reasoning to draw him into Truth.”44  
Admonishment and exhortation were not antithetical to reason in Locke’s 
view.  Thomas Jefferson used reason in a similar sense when he proposed 
the following bill in 1779: “The holy author of our religion, who being Lord 
both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either, 
as was in his Almighty power to do, but to extend it by its influence on 
reason alone.”45  The Founding Generation would have been categorically 
 
40  Lindgren, supra note 1, at 707. 
41  SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (10th ed. 1792). 
42  There is a vast literature on the American Enlightenment. For a useful starting point, 
see Shane J. Ralston, American Enlightenment Thought, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY, http://www.iep.utm.edu/amer-enl/  (last visited Sept. 1, 2016) (summarizing 
the central beliefs of the American enlightenment, including its support for a Lockean view 
of religious toleration). 
43  See A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, 18 Jun. 1779, FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
NATIONAL ARCHIVES, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0132-
0004-0082 (last updated Mar. 28, 2016); THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, Vol. 2, 545–53 (Julian P. Boyd, ed., 1950); Gerald S. Sandler, Lockean Ideas in 
Thomas Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom 21 J. HIST. IDEAS 110, 110 
(1960). 
44  JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS 14 (Mark 
Goldie ed., 2010).  Jefferson copied this passage from Locke into one of his notebooks. 
Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury, 11 October–9 December 1776, FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
National Archives, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-01-02-0222-0007 
(last updated Mar. 28, 2016); THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 43, Vol. 1, 
544–50. 
45  THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 43, at Vol. 1, 544–50. 
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opposed to any coercion in matters of religion, so the fit between the 
preamble and the enacting clause was actually quite tight in Lindgren’s 
example.  In short, his own evidence contradicts Volokh’s claims about the 
function of Founding Era preambles. 
The textualist arguments in favor of the militia-based view of the 
Amendment are among the strongest evidence to support this interpretation, 
but one need not rest such an argument on textualist grounds alone.  
Consider the case of St. George Tucker.46  Lindgren makes the following 
claim about Tucker’s understanding of the Second Amendment: “If, as the 
civic rights camp believes, the Framers believed in the civic rights view of 
the Second Amendment, somebody should have told St. George Tucker, 
perhaps the leading American legal commentator of the day.”47  It is not 
clear who exactly Lindgren believes should have told St. George Tucker 
about modern historical debates over his writings.  There are two basic 
evidentiary problems with his claims about Tucker.  First, Lindgren simply 
ignores Tucker’s clear statement that the reason the Second Amendment 
was adopted by the First Congress was to buttress the federalism provisions 
of the Tenth Amendment, a point that Justice Stevens raised in his Heller 
Dissent.48  Tucker’s text offers another example of a Founding Era source 
supporting a conception of the right to bear arms that Lindgren claims is a 
modern invention. 
The second flaw in Lindgren’s interpretation derives from his failure 
to engage in a genuinely holistic historical exercise of reconstructing 
Tucker’s vision of rights before zeroing in on his interpretation of the right 
 
46  Tucker was a leading Virginia jurist and prominent Jeffersonian who published an 
important annotated American edition of Blackstone’s COMMENTARIES. For Tucker’s 
relevance to modern debates over the Second Amendment, see District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 594–95 (2008). 
47  Lindgren, supra note 1, at 709. 
48  Heller, 554 U.S. at 666 n.32. Lindgren’s interpretation of Tucker relies entirely on the 
work of a single unrepresentative historian Robert Churchill. Lindgren, supra note 1 at 708.  
Most historians have been critical of Heller and the scholarship it rested on; for a quick 
summary, see Justice Breyer’s Dissent in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 914 
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the growing historical consensus that Heller was 
wrong).  For a discussion of Justice Stevens’ use of Tucker and modern gun rights 
interpretations of Tucker’s writings, see generally Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker's Lecture 
Notes, the Second Amendment, and Originalist Methodology: A Critical Comment, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1541 (2009). Lindgren’s failure to provide a full and balanced scholarly 
discussion of the evidence and debate over Tucker’s thoughts only underscores the 
ideologically distorted and tendentious nature of his essay. For a model scholarly treatment 
of this controversy that acknowledges the divergent interpretations of the Tucker evidence, 
see Martin H. Redish and Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional 
Interpretation, and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism” 
Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1485, 1499–1501 (2012). 
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to bear arms.  In volume two of Tucker’s Blackstone there is an expansive 
footnote that explains his conception of   rights.  Tucker divided rights into 
four different categories: natural, social, civil, and political.49  The right of 
self-preservation was a natural right.  The category of civil rights for Tucker 
included rights related to citizenship.  Thus, Tucker expressly noted that 
“aliens, women and children under the age of discretion . . . negroes and 
mulattoes . . . have no civil rights in Virginia, taken in this strict and limited 
sense.”50  These were precisely the groups in Virginia that did not bear 
arms, so Tucker’s category of “civil right” corresponds to the modern 
category of civic right.51  Lindgren approaches the Second Amendment with 
the simple dichotomous model that has come to dominate modern debate 
over this issue.  Any scholar who took Tucker’s thought seriously and 
sought to understand it historically would recognize that the learned 
Virginian’s eighteenth century conception of rights simply does not fit 
neatly into the modern categories Lindgren and other legal scholars have 
sought to impose on the past.  Lindgren and others who share his approach 
to the Second Amendment systematically conflate the common law right to 
keep or use arms for lawful purposes and the constitutional right to keep 
 
49  ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO 
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 145 n.42 (1803). My notion of a civic right, the concept 
that Lindgren disparages as a modern invention, was based on Tucker’s notion of a “civil 
right.”  I deliberately chose not to use Tucker’s own language because his preferred term 
carries such a different set of associations in modern law. See Civil Rights: An Overview, 
LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/civil_rights (last visited 
Sept. 1, 2016); Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker and the Second Amendment: Original 
Understandings and Modern Misunderstandings, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1123, 1143 
(2006) (arguing that the Second Amendment, by contrast, fit into Tucker’s third and fourth 
categories, civil rights and political rights). “Tucker’s term ‘civil right’ might best be 
rendered in modern parlance as a civic right, a right that ‘appertain[s] to a man as a citizen or 
subject.’” Id. (quoting TUCKER, supra note 49, at 300). In response to Lindgren’s snide 
suggestion that someone needed to inform Tucker about the existence of a civic right, it 
would be more relevant to ask why Lindgren did not discuss Tucker’s eighteenth century 
conception of civil rights and its relevance to arms bearing? 
50  TUCKER, supra note 49, at 145. 
51  See generally Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker and the Second Amendment: Original 
Understandings and Modern Misunderstandings, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1123 (2006) 
(arguing for the need to look at all of Tucker’s relevant writings on the right to bear arms not 
just the often quoted passage discussing the “palladium of liberty”). Cf. Stephen P. 
Halbrook, St. George Tucker’s Second Amendment: Deconstructing ‘The True Palladium of 
Liberty’, TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 3, 120 (2006) (making a gun-rights rebuttal to my 
interpretation).  Halbrook makes no effort to contextualize Tucker’s theory of rights and 
ignores the fact that his discussion of self-defense in the section on homicide makes no 
reference to bearing arms. Id.  
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and bear arms as part of a well-regulated militia.52  In Tucker’s 
terminology, the former was a natural right modified by common law and 
the latter was a civil right.  A Moravian pacifist in Pennsylvania might have 
been able to bear a gun for a variety of lawful purposes, but he would have 
been religiously scrupulous about bearing arms.53  Women and children 
might claim a right of individual self-defense under common law, but were 
not among those who were required to bear arms.54  Although not every use 
of the phrase “bear arms” was exclusively military, it was unquestionably 
the dominant usage in the print culture of the Founding Era.55  Even if one 
casts aside the actual patterns of usage, and treats the two usages as equally 
plausible, Founding Era rules of construction required a recourse to the 
text’s preamble as the appropriate way to decide which reading was legally 
correct.56 
Lindgren’s methodology also suffers from a common problem that 
nearly all originalist inquiry falls prey to, a failure to weigh and adequately 
contextualize eighteenth century texts, effectively treating all sources as if 
they were equally probative.57  Legal scholar Larry Kramer has described 
 
52  As Yale’s Reva Siegel observes, “there is more evidence in the majority opinion 
establishing the existence of a common law right of self-defense than there is demonstrating 
that such a right was constitutionalized by the Second Amendment’s eighteenth-century 
ratifiers.” Reva Siegel, Heller and Originalism’s Dead Hand, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1415 
(2009). 
53  The Pennsylvania Moravians provide one of the more interesting examples of 
conscientious objectors.  In contrast to Quakers whose radical peace testimony prohibited all 
forms of interpersonal violence, including harsh words and gossip, Moravians accepted the 
right of individual self-defense, but opposed bearing arms for military reasons. See generally 
Jared S. Burkholder, Neither “Kriegerisch” nor “Quäkerisch”: Moravians and the Question 
of Violence in Eighteenth-Century Pennsylvania, 12 J. MORAVIAN HIST. 143; Jack D. 
Marietta, Conscience, the Quaker Community, and the French and Indian War, 95 PA. MAG. 
HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 3 (1971); Hermann Wellenreuther, The Quest for Harmony in a 
Turbulent World: The Principle of “Love and Unity” in Colonial Pennsylvania Politics, 107 
PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 537 (1983). For additional discussion of the problem of 
conscientious objectors and the right to bear arms, see Saul Cornell, Conflict, Consensus & 
Constitutional Meaning: The Enduring Legacy of Charles Beard, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 
397–401 (2014). 
54  See Cornell, supra note 49, at 400. 
55  Nathan Kozuskanich, Originalism in a Digital Age: An Inquiry into the Right to Bear 
Arms, 29 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 585, 606 (2009) (reviewing the scholarly debate over the 
meaning of the term “bear arms” in the Founding Era and concluding that the dominant 
usage in the print culture of the period fits a military or collective self-defense understanding 
of the term). 
56  BLACKSTONE, supra note 48, at *60. 
57  As traditional originalist Richard Kay has noted, public meaning originalism has 
made it easier to manipulate sources about original meaning, not rendered originalism more 
rigorous. Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional 
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this originalist error as the “funhouse mirror” effect, in which evidence 
from the past is magnified out of proportion to its actual influence or 
significance, producing a grotesquely distorted version of the actual 
history.58  Lindgren’s discussion of Maine Anti-Federalist Samuel Nasson’s 
views of arms bearing illustrates this type of distortion.59  It is easy to see 
why Lindgren would have chosen Nasson’s text, which is readily available 
to modern researchers, because of its inclusion in modern documentary 
collections.60  The fact that a text is widely available to modern scholars 
does not necessarily mean that it was widely available in the Founding Era 
or even representative of broader views at the time it was written.  Nasson 
was writing to George Thatcher, a Federalist member of the First Congress, 
and a lawyer who would go on to become one of New England’s most 
illustrious jurists.61  Nasson was a barely literate Maine Anti-Federalist, an 
odd choice for a proxy for the typical reader of the Constitution posited by 
most originalist theories.62  Lindgren never provides a compelling legal 
justification for taking the views of the Anti-Federalists electoral losers and 
substituting them for the victorious Federalists who dominated the First 
Congress that actually wrote the Second Amendment.63  There is no 
 
Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 719 (2009). 
58  Larry D. Kramer, When Lawyers Do History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387, 394 
(2003); see also Cornell, supra note 49, at 390–91. 
59  Lindgren commits a common originalist error by treating the Founding Era as if it 
were a time of broad constitutional consensus instead of recognizing the profound tensions 
and conflicts in this period.  See Cornell, supra note 51, at 47.  On the range of voices in the 
Founding Era on the meaning of the right to keep and bear arms, see SAUL CORNELL, A 
WELL REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN 
AMERICA 41–70 (2006).  For a slightly revised version of this argument based on post-Heller 
scholarship, see Saul Cornell, The Right to Bear Arms, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE 
U.S. CONSTITUTION 739–44 (Mark Tushnet et al. eds., 2015). 
60  Samuel Nasson, Letter from Samuel Nasson to George Thatcher (July 9, 1789), in 
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL 
CONGRESS 260–61 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991). 
61  See Cornell, supra note 59, at 64. 
62  On the political culture of the Maine frontier in this period, see ALAN TAYLOR, 
LIBERTY MEN AND THE GREAT PROPRIETORS: THE REVOLUTIONARY SENTIMENT ON THE 
MAINE FRONTIER 1760–1820, 110 (1990). For an overview of the originalism debate 
including the rise of the new originalism, see generally Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A 
Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (2013). 
63  See generally Saul Cornell, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE 
DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788–1828 (1999) (arguing that anti-federalism is best 
understood as including at least three distinctive groups—elites, middling radicals, and 
plebeian radicals; the backcountry was dominated by the latter two groups); Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional Adjudication, 90 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1753 (2015) (analyzing different models of historical meaning relevant to 
constitutional theory). 
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credible historical evidence to support Lindgren’s assumption that Nasson’s 
views had any influence on Thatcher or any other members of the First 
Congress.  If Nasson’s view had been as typical or as influential as 
Lindgren claims, Congress would have modeled the language of the Second 
Amendment on the Dissent of the Pennsylvania Minority, a widely 
distributed Anti-Federalist text which had demanded express protection for 
a right to hunt.64  Yet, despite its wide distribution, no other published 
author or state ratification convention echoed the Dissent’s demands for 
such a right and it was not included in the text Madison consulted when 
drafting the Second Amendment.65 
Lindgren’s silence about Thatcher’s extensive discussion of the 
meaning of the right to bear arms written in the Cumberland Gazette is also 
puzzling.  “Scribble Scrabble,” the identity Thatcher adopted in his popular 
writing, offers yet another example of an eighteenth century source that 
supports a civic conception of arms bearing that Lindgren claims is a 
modern invention.66  As this brief response has repeatedly demonstrated, 
Lindgren has not grappled with the voluminous scholarly literature on this 
issue, especially scholarship written after Heller.67  Nor has he 
demonstrated a solid grasp of the relevant historical methodologies 
necessary  to understand the meaning of Founding era legal texts.  The role 
of history in constitutional adjudication remains controversial, but one thing 
seems indisputable: if we are going to use history in constitutional law we 
 
64  Joseph Blocher, Hunting and the Second Amendment, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 133, 
160–61 (2015). 
65  See Paul Finkelman, A Well Regulated Militia: The Second Amendment in Historical 
Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195, 208 (2000) (discussing how Madison “emphatically 
rejected the goals and language” of the Dissent in drafting the Second Amendment).  For 
another discussion of the problems of using the Dissent as proxy for broader patterns of 
belief about the meaning of arms bearing, see Saul Cornell, The Original Meaning of 
Original Understanding: A Neo-Blackstonian Critique, 67 MD. L. REV. 150, 158–60 (2007). 
66  George Thatcher, Scribble Scrabble, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE, Dec. 8, 1786.  In this 
essay Thatcher uses the term “bear arms” broadly to include both military and non-military 
uses, while simultaneously asserting that only bearing arms for the common defense was 
constitutionally entrenched in the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  For a discussion of 
Thatcher’s views on the right to bear arms, see generally Patrick J. Charles, Scribble 
Scrabble, the Second Amendment, and Historical Guideposts: A Short Reply to Lawrence 
Rosenthal and Joyce Lee Malcolm, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1821 (2015).   
67  In his preface, Lindgren commends the articles in the symposium for adopting “a 
seriousness of tone and a commitment to evidence-based reasoning.”  Lindgren, supra note 
1, at 711. He further suggests that future scholarship must “follow the evidence to reach 
conclusions that our ideological compatriots might not embrace.” Id. at 715. Given these 
statements, the failure to cite or engage with post-Heller scholarship is even harder to 
fathom.    
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need to get the history right.68  At the start of his foreword, Lindgren 
warned: “Guns seem to have a strange power over people: too often passion 
drives out thought.”69 Ironically, Lindgren’s own essay has become yet 
another illustration of this sad fact. Instead of moving the debate forward, 
Lindgren’s account is stuck in the acrimonious pre-Heller world.  It is time 




68  For good discussions of the multiple roles history might play in contemporary 
constitutional theory, see Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 657 (2013); see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and 
Varied Roles of History in Constitutional Adjudication, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753 
(2015). 
69  Lindgren, supra note 1, at 705. 
